Every operation of the Identity API, under /iam/api. Sign requests with an access key (Authorization: EWS-ACCESS-KEY <id>:<secret>). A successful JSON response is { "success": true, "data": … }.
IAM principals — humans and service accounts
The organization's rules for IAM-user console passwords
The organization's CLI sign-in policy: Touch ID or a passkey for people, and personal access key age
Collections of users that share policies
Named policy bundles assignable to users
External OIDC issuers (GitHub Actions, …) whose tokens roles can trust
The company identity provider people sign in to the console through (OIDC or SAML)
Allow/Deny documents evaluated on every request
Capabilities granted on one resource — the Access panel’s half of policy
Long-lived credentials for the API, the CLI, Terraform and S3 clients, optionally capped by a scope policy
AI agents connected to the MCP endpoint: what each session may do
Organization membership and org-level roles
Pending invites to join the organization
Every write, denial, sensitive read and sign-in: who, from where, what, and how it was answered
Where the audit log is exported (S3, webhook, syslog) and the alarms on it (email)
Generated from the API description, the same one the API checks requests against and the CLI is built from.