Security in Apps

The IAM actions that govern apps, the permissions each operation needs beyond its own, what is audited, how secrets reach a machine, and what is exposed to the internet.

Last updated 18 November 2026View as Markdown

IAM actions

Apps are a regional service: an app's resource name is rn:ews:<region>:<organization id>:deploy:app/<app id>, for example rn:ews:de1:org-EXAMPLE1234:deploy:app/3f1c2b4a-5d6e-4f70-8a91-b2c3d4e5f601, and rn:ews:de1:org-EXAMPLE1234:deploy:* covers every app. Listing apps, or looking one up by slug, needs deploy:DescribeApp on that wildcard.

ActionAccessWhat it allows
deploy:DescribeAppReadList and describe apps, deployments, and their status
deploy:GetBuildLogsRead · sensitiveRead the log of a deployment's image build, live while it runs
deploy:CreateAppWriteCreate a new app
deploy:UpdateAppWrite · destructiveUpdate an app’s build, runtime, or routing configuration
deploy:DeleteAppWrite · destructiveDelete an app and its deployments
deploy:DeployAppWrite · destructiveTrigger a new deployment (build + release) of an app
deploy:ManageEnvWrite · destructiveView and edit an app’s environment variables and secret bindings
deploy:ManageDomainWrite · destructiveAttach, verify, and remove custom domains for an app
deploy:ManageDatabaseBindingWrite · destructiveBind an app to a managed Postgres database (generated DATABASE_URL), rotate its credential, unbind
deploy:ManageHostDatabaseWriteAdd a Postgres database on a pooled app's pool host, back it up now, or move it to managed Postgres
deploy:RestoreHostDatabaseWrite · destructiveReplace a pooled app's pool-host database with one of its backups (the current data is backed up first)
deploy:DescribeJobsReadList an app’s scheduled jobs and read their run history and output
deploy:CreateJobWriteAdd a scheduled job (command + cron schedule) to an app
deploy:UpdateJobWrite · destructiveChange, enable or disable an app’s scheduled job
deploy:DeleteJobWrite · destructiveRemove a scheduled job and its run history
deploy:RunJobWriteRun a scheduled job now, outside its schedule
deploy:ManageErrorsBindingWrite · destructiveConnect an app to an Error Tracking project (generated SENTRY_DSN, SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT, SENTRY_RELEASE, and a per-build upload token), disconnect
deploy:ManageCacheBindingWrite · destructiveBind an app to a managed Valkey cache (generated REDIS_URL / VALKEY_URL), unbind
deploy:ManageBrokerBindingWrite · destructiveBind an app to a managed Kafka cluster (KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS …), RabbitMQ broker (AMQP_URL, AMQP_HOSTS …) or Document Database cluster (MONGODB_URL) as one of its users, unbind
deploy:AgentSyncWriteDeploy agent: fetch desired state and report runtime status

Generated from the service’s IAM descriptor. Sensitive reads hand over secret material or source code and are recorded in the audit log like writes; destructive writes delete, overwrite or revoke.

Permissions beyond the operation's own

Operation Also needs
Any write with "redeploy": true, Redeploy now deploy:DeployApp
Roll back with the environment restored deploy:ManageEnv; secrets:GetSecretValue on a secret the app does not use right now
Bind a secret in the environment or a registry credential secrets:GetSecretValue on the secret; binding grants it to the deploy consumer
Import a .env file secrets:CreateSecret, secrets:RotateSecret, secrets:UseSecretSource, secrets:GetSecretValue, as the plan needs
Bind or rotate a database (deploy:ManageDatabaseBinding) rds:ModifyDBInstance on the database; for a branch, rds:GetDBBranchCredentials as well
Bind a cache (deploy:ManageCacheBinding) cache:ModifyCacheCluster on the cache
Bind a Kafka cluster, RabbitMQ broker or Document Database (deploy:ManageBrokerBinding) secrets:GetSecretValue on the password secret of the user you bind
Reveal a binding's password secrets:GetSecretValue on the role's secret (the master password's for a master binding); recorded on its access log
See bound databases, caches and brokers on Resources that service's describe permission
Read a container's log lines on Resources monitoring:FilterLogEvents
Each push deploying a repository app the person who pushed holds deploy:DeployApp on the app

GET /deploy/api/apps/{id} returns the environment only to a caller with deploy:ManageEnv, and the compose file only to one with deploy:UpdateApp; the response says when either was withheld. The Deutsche Cloud Console shows which action is missing instead of hiding a panel.

The app's Access tab shows who may view the app, deploy it, manage its environment or administer it. Granting from there needs iam:AttachUserPolicy; without it the tab still shows the grants and names the missing action.

Audit

Every write is recorded in the audit log, allowed or denied. Reading a build log (deploy:GetBuildLogs) is a sensitive read: it is recorded too, and the ReadOnly policy does not include it. See Audit log.

Secrets and data protection

  • A secret bound to an app is decrypted at deployment and handed to the machine, never stored on the app and never returned by the API. An environment export writes references and names, never a secret value.
  • A secret created by a .env import is encrypted under your CMK.
  • A database binding's password is a secret the binding reads at every rollout.
  • The desired-versus-live comparison sends only keyed hashes of environment values off the machine; see What runs on your machines.
  • Build logs mask credentials in URLs.

Network exposure

  • Only the published service is reachable from outside, through the app's domains over HTTPS; a compose file may not publish a host port.
  • Compose services reach each other on a private app network.
  • A machine obtains certificates only for names its app's domains cover.
  • A private database's public endpoint admits only the control plane, never an app's machine; a binding that would need it is refused.
  • Compose files may not use privileged, extra capabilities, host namespaces, devices or host paths.
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